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We establish an empirical link between the ex-ante uncertainty about macroeconomic fundamentals
and the ex-post resolution of this uncertainty in financial markets. We measure macroeconomic
uncertainty using prices of economic derivatives and relate this measure to changes in implied
volatilities of stock and bond options when the economic data is released. We also examine the
relationship between our measure of macroeconomic uncertainty and trading activity in stock and
bond option markets before and after the announcements. Higher macroeconomic uncertainty is
associated with greater reduction in implied volatilities. Higher macroeconomic uncertainty is also
associated with increased volume in option markets after the release, consistent with market
participants waiting to trade until economic uncertainty is resolved, and with decreased open interest
in option markets after the release, consistent with market participants using financial options to
hedge macroeconomic uncertainty. The empirical relationships are strongest for long-term bonds and
weakest for non-cyclical stocks.
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How important is uncertainty about macroeconomic fundamentals for ¯nancial markets?
The literature has tried to answer this question indirectly by measuring the response of asset
prices, including those of derivatives, to macroeconomic announcements.1 Evidence that
new information about the economy matters for ¯nancial markets implies that uncertainty
in these markets should be associated with uncertainty about the state of the economy.
Consistent with this reasoning, Ederington and Lee (1996) and Beber and Brandt (2006)
document that the uncertainty implicit in options written on U.S. Treasury bond futures
drops substantially after the release of macroeconomic news. This observation suggests that
when ¯nancial markets learn about the state of the economy, some uncertainty in ¯nancial
markets is resolved. However, despite this indicative evidence, we still do not know precisely
how and to what extent the ex-post resolution of uncertainty in ¯nancial markets is related
to the ex-ante uncertainty of market participants about the state of the economy.
Uncertainty about the state of the economy is unobserved and therefore di±cult to
quantify. Previous studies have used measures of cross-sectional disagreement, such as the
standard deviation of forecasts across economists, to proxy for uncertainty (e.g., Andersen,
Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003)), but such disagreement measures are generally weakly
correlated with measures of true uncertainty (see Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987)). We
establish a more direct link between the ex-ante uncertainty of macroeconomic fundamentals
and the ex-post resolution of uncertainty in ¯nancial markets. We measure macroeconomic
uncertainty using prices of economic derivatives traded in a new auction-based market
launched in 2002 jointly by Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank. These economic derivatives
represent explicit bets on news about macroeconomic fundamentals and their option-implied
standard deviations therefore provide a direct measure of the ex-ante uncertainty of market
participants about the news release.
Although the economic derivatives market is relatively young, it is already closely watched
by market participants and the media before scheduled macroeconomic announcements as a
barometer of market views. For example, Bloomberg News reported the following before a
recent announcement of U.S. payroll statistics:2
1Several recent papers have investigated the response of bond, stock, and currency markets to scheduled
macroeconomic announcements (e.g., Balduzzi, Elton, and Green (2001), Flannery and Protopapadakis
(2002), and Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2005)). The results reveal a signi¯cant impact of
economic announcements on returns, their volatility, and market liquidity.
2Source: \Dollar advances on speculation job growth may exceed forecasts," Bloomberg News, May 7,
2004. Other headlines for this announcement include \... economic derivatives o®ered by Deutsche Bank and
Goldman Sachs showed markets betting on Friday for February jobs growth of around 137,000. Markets had
been going for about 145,000 on Thursday." (\Dollar ¯rm while U.S. jobs data looms," Reuters News, March
1... U.S. employers probably added 170,000 jobs last month, according
to the median estimate of 75 economists surveyed by Bloomberg News.
The Labor Department releases the ¯gures at 8:30 a.m. in Washington.
Traders expect 186,200 jobs new in April, an auction of economic
derivatives showed. The derivatives, created by Deutsche Bank AG
and Goldman Sachs Group Inc and marketed through ICAP Plc, were
auctioned yesterday and today.
Besides this high degree of visibility, economic derivatives are likely to provide an accurate
measure of ex-ante uncertainty about the state of the economy for at least two other
reasons.3 First, the market for economic derivatives is dominated by sophisticated investors
(predominantly hedge funds and proprietary trading desks). Second, auctions take place
only one or two days prior to the announcement, leaving little room for market views to
change before the subsequent news release.
Our paper makes at least two contributions to the literature. First, we establish
explicitly the link between ex-ante uncertainty about economic fundamentals and the ex-
post resolution of this uncertainty in ¯nancial markets. Based on our results, we can
predict, for instance, how a temporary or structural change in the uncertainty about economic
fundamentals will a®ect the volatility of bonds, stock indices, and individual stocks. There
are several reasons for the uncertainty about economic fundamentals to change, including
the economy transitioning into a new phase of the business cycle (a temporary change) or
the Government changing its statistical reporting protocol (a structural change). Second,
we examine how the ex-ante uncertainty about economic fundamentals is related to trading
activity in ¯nancial markets, as measured by open interest and volume, before and after the
announcement. Trading activity tells us how market participants deal with (i.e., hedge or
speculate) uncertainty about the state of the economy.
The design of our analysis is straightforward. We ¯rst con¯rm that stock and bond
markets react to macroeconomic announcements in our sample period. We then extract
measures of macroeconomic uncertainty from the observed prices of economic derivatives.
Finally, we relate these measures of macroeconomic uncertainty to changes in implied
volatility of stock and bond options when the economic data is released as well as to the
changes in transacted volume and open interest in stock and bond option markets.
5, 2004) and \... economists expected February payrolls to rise 130,000, according to a survey conducted by
CBS MarketWatch. In the economic derivatives market run by Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank and ICAP
were looking for a gain of about 140,000 new positions." (CBS/AP, March 5, 2004).
3In a concurrent paper, GÄ urkaynak and Wolfers (2005) show that expectations derived from economic
derivatives are somewhat more accurate than survey-based forecasts.
2We ¯nd that higher ex-ante uncertainty about macroeconomic fundamentals is associated
with greater reduction in the implied volatilities of stock and bond options when the economic
data is released. The results are more pronounced for bonds than for stocks. Speci¯cally,
we observe that the degree of uncertainty about the Non-Farm Payroll (NFP) report, for
example, explains more than 40 percent of the drop in the volatility of Treasury bond futures
and more than 20 percent of the drop in the volatility of Eurodollar futures. This resolution in
bond market uncertainty appears to be permanent. We also observe an association, although
weaker, between macroeconomic uncertainty and the implied volatilities of stock index
options. Finally, we document that within the stock index, cyclical stocks are substantially
more exposed to macroeconomic uncertainty than non-cyclical stocks.
Concerning the link between macroeconomic uncertainty and trading behavior, we ¯nd
evidence that the degree of uncertainty a®ects signi¯cantly the trading strategies employed
by market participants for both options written on Treasury bond futures and on cyclical
stocks. In particular, higher macroeconomic uncertainty is associated with a greater increase
in transacted volume after the news release. This observation is consistent with market
participants waiting to trade until after the resolution of economic uncertainty and suggests
that the \calm before the storm" e®ect is calmer the stronger the storm is expected to be.
We also ¯nd a negative relation between macroeconomic uncertainty and the reduction of
open interest after the news release. This result is consistent with market participants closing
out hedging positions and with the degree of hedging activity depending on the degree of
macroeconomic uncertainty to be hedged.
Besides contributing to the growing literature on the response of ¯nancial markets to
macroeconomic news (e.g., Ederington and Lee (1996), Beber and Brandt (2006), and the
references in footnote 1), our paper relates to the research examining the economic sources
of return volatility. David and Veronesi (2002) show that an uncertainty measure obtained
from a model of real earnings growth is related to the implied volatilities of equity options.
Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005) ¯nd that a proxy for the di®erences in beliefs forecasts the
implied volatility of index options and is related to index options volume. Dubinsky and
Johannes (2005) study the evolution of uncertainty around earnings announcements using
the implied volatilities of individual equity options. We add to this literature by employing
an economic uncertainty measure that is based on prices of economic derivatives and is thus
market-based, high-frequency, and intrinsically related to the macro economy. These features
of our uncertainty measure allow us to uncover a strong relation between the uncertainty of
economic fundamentals and ¯nancial markets volatility. We also demonstrate how the link
between macroeconomic fundamentals and ¯nancial markets depends on the type of assets,
with long-term bonds at one extreme and non-cyclical stocks at the other.
3The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the economic derivatives and
¯nancial options data. Section 3 explains our methodology for estimating the uncertainty
implicit in economic derivatives and how we relate this measure to the implied volatilities in
¯nancial markets and to the trading strategies of options market participants. We present
our empirical results in Section 4. Section 5 concludes with a summary of our ¯ndings.
2 Data
2.1 Economic derivatives
Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank launched the market for derivative securities on scheduled
macroeconomic announcements, covering initially non-farm payrolls (NFP), the Institute
of Supply Management (ISM) manufacturing report, and U.S. retail sales ex-autos (RS)
in October 2002.4 The liquidity of this market was enhanced shortly thereafter through
an agreement with ICap (the largest interdealer broker for over-the-counter derivatives)
to distribute the securities to the inter-dealer market.5 Economic derivatives are priced
parimutuelly in a Universal Dutch auction in which as many orders as possible are ¯lled at
the same clearing price.6 This auction format is designed to maximize liquidity.
We collect data on auctions of economic derivatives completed between October 2002 and
June 2005 from Goldman Sachs. Our sample consists of 161 auctions covering 32 releases of
non-farm payroll, 28 releases of the Institute of Supply Management manufacturing report,
25 releases of retail sales ex-autos, and 51 releases of initial jobless claims.
Economic derivatives are structured as calls, puts, and digital options. These securities
can be traded by themselves or in combinations such as spreads, straddles, strangles, and risk
reversals. The strike prices are set to re°ect the range of possible outcomes. The payo®s of
the call (put) options are capped at the highest (lowest) available strike price. The underlying
is the initial release of a given macroeconomic statistic on the scheduled announcement date.
Revisions of the data that typically follow the initial release do not matter for the payo®s
of economic derivatives. The client base for economic derivatives is primarily hedge funds,
4Contracts on other releases were introduced later. Speci¯cally, contracts on the Eurozone harmonized
index of consumer prices (HICP) were introduced in May 2003, contracts on initial job claims started trading
in February 2004, contracts on the U.S. gross domestic product started trading in January 2005, and contracts
on the U.S. international trade balance were introduced in February 2005.
5The Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and Goldman Sachs recently announced a partnership to
further enhance the liquidity of economic derivatives through integrated clearing and marketing agreements.
6All trades at a given strike are executed at the same price, as it is common in Dutch auctions. However,
in the case of economic derivatives, it is possible to enter limit orders. The equilibrium price is determined
by an auction-clearing algorithm that maximizes total trades.
4proprietary trading desks, and in°ation swap traders.
There are typically two auctions for each announcement. At the beginning of the sample,
the ¯rst auction was held three days before the release and the second auction was held one
day before the release. After experimenting for a short period with only one auction the
day before the release, there are now again two auctions. The ¯rst auction is held in the
afternoon of the day before the release and the second auction is held in the early morning of
the day of the release. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the participation in the ¯rst auction
is mainly from U.S. customers, whereas the second auction gets slightly more than half U.K.
and European participation. We do not have ¯gures on transacted volume. However, we
gather through informal conversations with Goldman Sachs that digital options are about
three quarters of the trades yet less than half of the transacted volume. Vanilla options
are generally preferred by hedgers and are therefore transacted in greater size and volume.
Figure 1 provides a snapshot of our data for one auction.
2.2 Fixed income options
We collect daily at-the-money implied volatilities from Datastream for options on the 30-year
Treasury bond futures traded at the CBOT, options on the 10-year Treasury note futures
traded also at the CBOT, and options on the Eurodollar futures traded at the CME, for
the sample period of the economic derivatives data. These options are American-style and
Datastream thus computes their implied volatilities using a binomial model. We also obtain
prices of options on the 5-year Treasury note futures directly from the CBOT, where they are
traded, and compute implied volatilities using the same approach as Datastream.7 We also
collect daily data on transacted volume and open interest for each option contract written
on the 30-year Treasury bond futures, 10-year Treasury note futures, 5-year Treasury note
futures, and Eurodollar futures from the CBOT and CME.
For each underlying asset, we obtain two series of at-the-money implied volatilities. The
¯rst series uses option settlement prices from the nearest expiry month, interpolating between
the implied volatilities of options with strike prices immediately above and below the price
of the underlying. This series switches to the next available month on the ¯rst day of the
expiry month. We also obtain a series of at-the-money implied volatility for a constant time
to maturity of 30 days, computed by interpolating the implied volatilities of options maturing
immediately before and after 30 days.8 We construct both implied volatility series using only
7Datastream does not cover options on the 5-year Treasury note futures before the end of 2003.
8Datastream provides this series of at-the-money implied volatility also for maturities of 90 days and 180
days. Since the macroeconomic announcements that we investigate are released monthly, it is reasonable to
5call options, using only put options, or using both. In general, we present empirical results
obtained from implied volatilities using both call and put options, since this measure is more
robust to measurement errors (see Hentschel (2003)). However, our results are robust to
these various ways of constructing the implied volatility series.
2.3 Equity options
We also collect daily data on the CBOE volatility index (VIX) for our sample period. VIX is
a measure of expected stock market volatility over the next 30 days computed from market
prices of Standard and Poors (S&P) 500 index options traded at the CBOE. The VIX
calculation is based on a weighted average of out-of-the-money put and call prices and does
not rely on a speci¯c option pricing model.9 In addition, we obtain daily data on S&P 500
index options as well as on individual equity options from OptionMetrics. The data consists
of midpoint quotes at the close, implied volatilities (computed by OptionMetrics using either
the Black-Scholes formula for the European style index options or a binomial tree model for
the American style individual equity options), and standard sensitivity measures. Due to
the delay in the database update, this part of our data only goes through December 2004.
In contrast to index options, options markets for many individual ¯rms are very illiquid.
In order to assure a minimum level of liquidity and hence data integrity, we focus exclusively
on individual equity options for ¯rms that are part of the S&P 100 index, since an explicit
requirement for membership in this index is to have a liquid options market.10 We then sort
stocks into industries and further into groups of industries that we anticipate to be cyclical
or non-cyclical. Speci¯cally, we base our industry classi¯cation on the results of Boudoukh,
Richardson, and Whitelaw (1994), who sort industries by their correlation between industry
level output growth and aggregate output growth. We label the ¯ve industries with the
highest output growth beta as cyclical and the ¯ve industries with the lowest output growth
beta as non-cyclical.11 This sorting procedure results in a sample of individual equity options
on 22 cyclical ¯rms and on 14 non-cyclical ¯rms.
expect the strongest impact at a 30-day horizon. We therefore focus on 30 days maturities in our empirical
analysis but also veri¯ed that our results are robust to using longer time to maturity options.
9The CBOE website provides further details on the VIX construction methodology.
10See the S&P 100 index fact sheet. Driessen, Maenhout, and Vilkov (2005) use the same selection criteria.
11We use the output growth betas from Table 1 of Boudoukh, Richardson, and Whitelaw (1994). The
cyclical industries are primary metals, transportation equipment, rubber and plastics, metal products, and
electrical machinery. The non-cyclical industries are food and beverage, tobacco, utilities, printing and
publishing, and petroleum products.
63 Methodology
3.1 Pricing economic derivatives
We infer the implied mean and standard deviation of the macroeconomic news release from
the prices of both digital and vanilla options on the announcement. We use options with all
strike prices from the auction closest to the announcement. To compute the option-implied
moments, we make two simplifying assumptions. We assume that the underlying economic
release is normally distributed around the mean forecast and that markets are complete.
The normality assumption is empirical quite reasonable, but the completeness assumption
is more controversial. While the release of a macroeconomic statistic is clearly a non-
traded underlying, there are many traded assets with returns that are highly correlated with
economic news (e.g., bonds). Furthermore, we need the assumption of market completeness
only to obtain an estimate of the uncertainty about the release implicit in economic
derivatives, without implying that this is a precise or even unique measure of the variance
of the risk-neutral distribution. Unless errors in our inferences are systematically correlated
with asset prices, which they should not be especially when markets are incomplete, we
expect market incompleteness to only bias our analysis against ¯nding signi¯cant results.
The price of a vanilla call option on the economic statistic F with expiration date T (the
release date) and with strike price K is:
CT;K = Et
£
Mt;T (FT ¡ K)
+¤
; (1)
where MT denotes a stochastic discount factor and x+ ´ max(0;x). Assuming markets are
complete, we express, without loss of generality, the stochastic discount factor as a function




M (FT)(FT ¡ K)






+ qt (FT) dFT;
(2)
where pt(FT) denotes the conditional distribution of the economic release, qt(FT) denotes
the corresponding risk-neutral distribution de¯ned by the transformation:
qt(FT) ´ e
r(T¡t)M (FT)pt (FT); (3)
and r is the continuously compounded (T ¡ t)-period interest rate. Since the auction and
7the release generally take place on the same day, we consider the e®ect of discounting as
negligible and drop the discount factor from equation (3). Finally, we eliminate the max




(FT ¡ K)qt (FT)dFT: (4)
We assume that the risk-neutral distribution qt(F) of the economic release is conditionally
Gaussian with mean ¹ and standard deviation ¾. Under this assumption, the solution to
equation (4) is similar to the Black-Scholes formula:
CK;T =
£




with K¤ = (K ¡ ¹)=¾ and




Equation (6) represents the expected value of the economic release conditional on the option
being exercised. Á(x) and ©(x) denote standard normal probability density and cumulative
distribution functions evaluated at x, respectively.12 Since the payo® of the traded call is
capped at the highest available strike price (cap), we obtain the price of the capped call by
adding a short position in a call at the highest strike price:
C
cap
K;T = CK;T ¡ CK=cap;T: (7)
The price of a vanilla put options under the normality assumption is given by:
PK;T = [K ¡ E (FTjFT · K)]©(K
¤); (8)
where




The payo® of the traded put is capped at the lowest strike price (floor) and can be obtained
by adding a short positions in a put option with the lowest strike price:
P
cap
K;T = PK;T ¡ PK=floor;T: (10)
12The expected value of the normally distributed economic release conditional on exercise corresponds to
the expected value of a truncated normal distribution, where the truncation point is given by the strike price.
See Johnson and Kotz (1970) for the formula of the expected value of a truncated normal random variable.
8The normality assumption also leads to relatively simple expressions for the prices of






Under normality and dropping again the discount factor, this expression simpli¯es to:
DCK;T = ©(¡K
¤): (12)
Similarly, the price for a digital put option is given by:
DPK;T = ©(K
¤): (13)
The ultimate goal of this section is to arrive at a way to estimate the parameters
of the Gaussian risk-neutral distribution, ¹ and ¾, for each macroeconomic news release
using options with di®erent strike prices. Consider for a given announcement at date T
a cross-section of N prices of vanilla and digital call and put options which di®er only
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where the ¯rst option price in the squared brackets represents the data and the second term
is the corresponding theoretical price from equations (7), (10), (12), and (13).
3.2 Economic and ¯nancial markets uncertainty
For each macroeconomic announcement with a pre-announcement auction, we obtain an
estimate of the uncertainty ¾t implicit in the prices of the economic derivatives using the
procedure described above. We then test whether this measure of ex-ante uncertainty about
13The prices of vanilla options can be approximated by combinations of digital options if there exists a
continuum of strike prices. The prices of call and put options with the same strike price is also linked through
put-call parity. However, since strike prices are discretely spaced, we do not have information on the liquidity
of each contract, and the underlying is in principle a non-traded asset, we assume that each option contract
contains independent information. We thus use all the available option prices in our estimation.
9economic fundamentals has predictive ability for the ex-post resolution of uncertainty in





= ® + ¯¾t + et; (15)
where IVt¡1 is the implied volatility of a given ¯nancial security (e.g., bond, equity index, or
individual equity) the day prior to the news release and IVt is the implied volatility the day
of the news release (after the announcement). We also estimate equation (15) using IVt+1 in
place of IVt to understand whether the resolution of uncertainty is transitory and whether
the process of uncertainty resolution is instantaneous or takes some time.
The resolution of uncertainty in the equity market can be overshadowed by the leverage
e®ect { the empirical observation that a large negative return tends to be associated more
with an increase in volatility than an equally large positive return. If, for some reason, stock
prices drop on the announcement day, implied volatility increases due to the leverage e®ect
and any resolution of uncertainty related to the macroeconomic release is harder to detect.
When we estimate regression (15) for the equity index or individual equities, we therefore





= ® + ¯¾t + °Rett;t¡1 + et; (16)
where Rett;t¡1 represents the return of the underlying asset on the announcement day.
Similarly, we investigate the trading behavior of market participants in the ¯nancial
option markets by estimating the following two regressions:
(V olut ¡ V olut¡1)
V olut¡1
= ® + ¯¾t + et; (17)
(Ointt ¡ Ointt¡1)
Ointt¡1
= ® + ¯¾t + et; (18)
where V olut and Ointt are respectively the traded volume and open interest on the day of
the announcement for the ¯nancial options contracts with closest quarterly maturity date.14
14The empirical results are very similar if we consider trading volume and open interest of the options
closest to maturity, regardless of whether it is a quarterly maturity date or not, or if we consider volume
and open interest of all options with less than 60 days to maturity.
104 Empirical results
4.1 Do ¯nancial markets react to macroeconomic news?
A precondition for macroeconomic uncertainty to be related to volatility in ¯nancial markets
is that the new information released in the announcement moves asset prices. If ¯nancial
markets do not react to macroeconomic news, there is no reason to expect that uncertainty
about economic fundamentals is re°ected in bond and stock market volatility. We therefore
begin our empirical analysis by investigating whether bond and stock prices respond at the
daily frequency to macroeconomic news during our sample period.15
To gauge the extent to which an announcement contains new information, we construct





where At is the value of the economic statistic released at time t, ¹t denotes the corresponding
market forecast implied by the economic derivatives prices and obtained by solving the
problem in equation (14), and ¾ is the (unconditional) empirical standard deviation of the
innovations At ¡¹t. Standardizing the surprise by the empirical standard deviation helps in
the interpretation of the results. We then estimate the following regression:
Rett;t¡1 = ® + ¯St + et; (20)
where Rett;t¡1 represents the percentage daily return on either the 30-year Treasury bond
futures (US), the 10-year Treasury note futures (TY), the 5-year Treasury-note futures (FV),
the Eurodollar futures (ED), the S&P 500 index, the portfolio of cyclical stocks, or the
portfolio of non-cyclical stocks.
Table 1 presents the regression results for the case of non-farm payrolls (NFP), which is
by far the most in°uential macroeconomic announcement during our sample period.16 Panel
A shows that a positive surprise in NFP is associated with strongly negative bond returns.
15While there is strong evidence in the literature that bond markets respond intra-daily to macroeconomic
news (e.g., Fleming and Remolona, 1999a) and some evidence that stock markets also respond intra-daily
to the same news (e.g., Flannery and Protopapadakis, 2002), it is important for the empirical design of our
paper to test whether this is true at the daily frequency and during our sample period.
16During our sample period, NFP is always released concurrently with the civilian unemployment rate
(CUR) in the employment report (ER). To ensure that the results in Table 1 are not driven by the CUR
release, we also include as regressor the standardized surprise of the CUR release, using the median forecast
provided by Money Market Services as proxy for market expectations. The results for the NFP release do
not change in this expanded regression speci¯cation.
11In all cases, the R2 indicates that more than 45 percent of the variance of announcement
day bond returns is explained by the surprises in NFP. More speci¯cally, a one-standard
deviation positive surprise in NFP is associated with a negative 82, 62, 44, and three basis
point daily return for the US, TY, FV, and ED futures, respectively. If we transform these
bond returns into bond yield changes using the modi¯ed duration of the underlying, we
naturally obtain the opposite ranking, i.e., the e®ect of NFP surprises on yields is greater
for shorter maturity and smaller for longer maturity bonds (results not tabulated).
Surprises in NFP have far less explanatory power for stock returns. Speci¯cally, the
announcement day return on the S&P 500 index is not signi¯cantly related to the surprises
in NFP. Any e®ect of the macroeconomic news on aggregate cash°ows and discount rates
appears to be either o®setting (i.e., discount rates and expected cash°ows changing in the
same direction) or swamped by other news about individual ¯rm cash°ows. Consistent with
this later explanation, we observe a weakly signi¯cant, at the 10 percent level, relationship
between the return on cyclical stocks and NFP surprises, explaining almost 10 percent of
the variation in announcement day returns of cyclical stocks. A one standard deviation
positive surprise in NFP is associated with a 46 basis points higher average daily return on
the portfolio of cyclical stocks. Additional analysis, not reported in the table, reveals that
if we estimate the regression (20) separately for each cyclical stock, we obtain positive slope
coe±cients for 20 of the 22 stocks, with eight being signi¯cant at least at the 10 percent
level. For two stocks the slope coe±cient is negative but insigni¯cant.
4.2 Implied macroeconomic uncertainty
We compute the macroeconomic uncertainty implied by the economic derivatives for all
NFP announcements in our sample using data from the auctions directly preceding the
news releases. We focus again on NFP because it is the most in°uential macroeconomic
announcement, and we consider only the second auction because it re°ects the most up-to-
date information before the announcement. It turns out, however, that the informational
contents of the auction held in the afternoon of the day before the announcement and of the
auction held in the morning of the day of the announcement are very similar. Speci¯cally, the
implied forecasts ¹t of the two auctions have a correlation of 0.99 and the implied volatilities
¾t have a correlation of 0.86.
Figure 2 plots our measure of macroeconomic uncertainty (dotted line), the VIX (light
solid line), and the 30-day implied volatility of Treasury bond futures (dark solid line). We
observe a pronounced downward trend in the implied return volatilities during our sample
period. Both stock and bond returns became less volatile. However, this downward trend
12is not shared by the uncertainty about NFP releases. If anything, economic fundamentals
became more uncertain. It is clear from this ¯gure that economic uncertainty and ¯nancial
markets volatility are far from perfectly correlated in levels. We hence turn to a more detailed
analysis relating macroeconomic uncertainty to changes in ¯nancial markets volatility.
4.3 Do ¯nancial markets re°ect macroeconomic uncertainty?
4.3.1 Bonds
As a ¯rst step in analyzing the resolution of macroeconomic uncertainty in bond markets, we
compute the unconditional average implied volatility of at-the-money call and put options
on the day before the NFP release and at the close of the announcement day. The average
at-the-money implied volatility the day before the announcement is 11.26 percent for options
written on the 30-year Treasury bond futures (US), 7.72 percent for options on the 10-year
Treasury note futures (TY), 5.39 percent for options on the 5-year Treasury note futures
(FV), and 30.59 percent for options on Eurodollar futures (ED), respectively.17 The average
at-the-money implied volatility after the announcement is 10.18 percent for options on US,
6.87 percent for options on TY, 4.74 percent for options on FV, and 27.83 percent for
options on ED, respectively. This represents a percentage decrease in implied volatility of
9.59 percent for options on US, 11.01 percent for options on TY, 12.01 percent for options on
FV, and 9.02 percent for options on ED. We conclude from this evidence that bond market
volatility drops unconditionally on macroeconomic announcement days.
Table 2 shows the results of regressing the percentage change in the implied volatility of
options written on US, TY, FV, or ED, on the uncertainty about the NFP announcement
implied by the economic derivatives.18 We observe that for the longer maturities (US,
TY, and FV), more than 40 percent of the across-announcement day variation in the
volatility drop is explained by the ex-ante uncertainty about the NFP release. The higher
the ex-ante uncertainty about NFP, the greater is the drop in implied volatility following
the announcement. This result is apparent in both the implied volatility of the closest
maturity options and the interpolated volatility with a 30-day horizon.19 The relationship
between macroeconomic uncertainty and changes in bond market volatility is not only highly
signi¯cant statistically but also important economically. For example, a high degree of
17The volatility of Eurodollar futures is conventionally quoted on the basis of the implied discount rate,
given by 100 minus the prevailing futures price.
18We also regress the percentage change in squared implied volatilities on ¾2
t, i.e. the risk-neutral variance
of the distribution of the economic release. The results are very similar, both in terms of statistical signi¯cance
and economic magnitude.
19We also obtain signi¯cant results, albeit weaker, when we measure volatility at a 90-day horizon.
13uncertainty about NFP equal to the average uncertainty in our sample plus two standard
deviations predicts about a 37 percent drop in the 30-days implied volatility of US or TY
options. This drop is obviously very large compared to the unconditional drop in implied
volatility of only 10 percent on announcement days.
To see if the resolution of uncertainty is transitory, we also test whether the e®ects on
implied volatility are still present at the close of the day following the announcement.20 We
observe that the e®ects of macroeconomic uncertainty on bond markets uncertainty persist,
both in terms of magnitude and statistical signi¯cance of the coe±cients. The explanatory
power of macroeconomic uncertainty for the longer horizon drop in volatility is somewhat
lower, but still more than one third in general.
We also try to understand whether there is a systematic role for good versus bad news
about the economy in resolving the uncertainty in bond markets. For this, we add as a
regressor the standardized surprise in the NFP release. The results (not tabulated) show
that the new information embedded in the surprise does not have a signi¯cant impact on
the change in bond implied volatilities. This also holds when we interact the standardized
surprise in the release with our measure of macroeconomic uncertainty.
4.3.2 Aggregate stock index
Table 3 shows the results for the S&P 500 index. In Panel A, we use changes in the
average implied volatilities of S&P 500 index options interpolated to have a constant time to
maturity of 30 days. Panel B is for changes in the average implied volatilities of the closest
to maturity options and next closest to maturity options, respectively. All but one of the
coe±cients relating changes in the implied index volatilities to our measure of macroeconomic
uncertainty are negative, in line with the results in Table 2. In contrast to those bond market
results, however, none of the coe±cients for the stock index are statistically signi¯cant. This
result is consistent with the observation from Table 1 that the stock index does not react
strongly to macroeconomic news. The resolution of economic uncertainty therefore also has
only little e®ect on the index volatility.
The coe±cients on the index return are all negative and, as expected, highly signi¯cant.
Recall from the discussion surrounding equation (16) that we add the index return to
explicitly take into account the well-documented leverage e®ect. Judging by the R2 of the
regressions, the leverage e®ect explains a vast majority of the changes in index volatility.
20Since the non-farm payrolls are generally released on Friday, we actually test if the relation between
implied volatility and macroeconomic uncertainty is still present after the weekend.
144.3.3 Cyclical and non-cyclical stocks
Given the considerably weaker results for the S&P 500 index, relative to the results for long-
and short-term bonds, we next consider a basket of options written on cyclical stocks. The
goal is to examine how the e®ect of macroeconomic uncertainty di®ers for stocks that we
know, from the regressions in Table 1, react more strongly to macroeconomic announcements.
Table 4 shows the results for cyclical stocks using again either the percentage change in
interpolated 30-day implied volatilities (Panel A) or the percentage change in raw implied
volatilities (Panel B). The regression speci¯cation is identical to that for the stock index.
However, we apply an additional data ¯lter in this case. We include in the analysis only
options that are traded on both the pre-announcement day and on the announcement day.
This is done to avoid any bias induced, for example, by options on volatile stocks being
traded on only one of the two days causing a spurious di®erence between the average implied
volatilities before and after the announcements.
Table 4 shows that the implied volatility of cyclical stocks is indeed related to the
uncertainty about macroeconomic fundamentals. Higher ex-ante uncertainty about NFP
is associated with a greater drop in implied volatility when the uncertainty is resolved. This
relation is statistically signi¯cant at the 10 percent level in all cases. The coe±cient is
greatest in magnitude for the short maturity raw implied volatilities in Panel B, consistent
with the monthly timing of NFP announcements. Finally, we note that the drop in implied
volatility appears to persist, given that the coe±cients for the day after the release are similar
in magnitude and statistical signi¯cance.
For comparison, we also repeat the analysis for non-cyclical stocks. The results, which
are not tabulated to conserve space, show that the volatility of non-cyclical stocks is
unrelated to the uncertainty about macroeconomic fundamentals. The coe±cients on the
ex-ante uncertainty about NFP are never statistically signi¯cant, their magnitudes are small
compared to the results for cyclical stocks, and the sign is even positive in a number of
cases. These results con¯rm that non-cyclical stocks are relatively immune to changes in
macroeconomic conditions, not only because contemporaneously their prices do not respond
to announcements (see Table 1) but also because ex-ante their implied volatilities do not
re°ect the degree of uncertainty about fundamentals.
4.4 How do markets deal with macroeconomic uncertainty?
Our results thus far document a strong link between the ex-ante uncertainty about NFP
releases and ¯nancial markets volatility. Clearly ¯nancial markets, and especially bond
markets, are concerned about changes in macroeconomic conditions and the uncertainty
15associated with scheduled macroeconomic announcements. Given this empirical fact, it is
reasonable to expect market participants to trade in a way that also re°ects the degree of
uncertainty about macroeconomic fundamentals. Speci¯cally, we expect a greater degree
of hedging or speculating before macroeconomic releases that are more uncertain, since the
bene¯ts of hedging or the gains from speculating increase with uncertainty. In this section, we
explore this hypothesis further by examining the relationship between the ex-ante uncertainty
about NFP releases and changes in trading volume and open interest in bond and equity
options on announcement days.
4.4.1 Bonds
Table 5 presents the results of regressing the change in the trading volume for the closest
quarterly maturity bond options on the ex-ante uncertainty about NFP releases. We observe
that across the di®erent option contracts a higher degree of macroeconomic uncertainty is
associated with a greater increase in trading volume after the resolution of the uncertainty.
We obtain the strongest statistical signi¯cance and explanatory power for the options written
on the ¯ve-year Treasury note futures. This observation is consistent with the evidence in the
literature that price discovery is most pronounced for intermediate maturities (e.g., Fleming
and Remolona, 1999b; Brandt and Kavajecz, 2004). The results are qualitatively the same
when we analyze separately the trading volume of call and put options (see panels B and C).
Although there is not a clear pattern is these disaggregated results, it appears that call option
trading volume is most important for the long and short bond maturities, whereas put option
trading volume plays a larger role for intermediate bond maturities. Finally, the relation
between macroeconomic uncertainty and trading volume is not only statistically signi¯cant
but also economically important. For example, a high degree of uncertainty about NFP
equal to one standard deviation above the mean uncertainty predicts a 35 percent increase
in traded volume of FV call and put options, more than three times the unconditional
increase in trading volume of 11 percent on announcement days.
These results on trading volume are consistent with market participants using options
to hedge against or speculate on the forthcoming NFP release. The greater the uncertainty
about NFP, the greater are the bene¯ts from hedging or gains from speculating. If a hedge
or speculative position is entered into gradually over the days preceding the announcement
and then unwound once the news is release, we would observe an increase in trading volume
after the announcement. The magnitude of this increase in trading volume would depend
on the size of the hedge or speculative position, which, in turn, is related on the degree of
macroeconomic uncertainty. An alternative explanation is that market participants wait to
16trade for reasons unrelated to the announcement until the uncertainty about NFP is resolved.
The higher the uncertainty, the greater are the incentives to wait.
To gain further insight into which of these two explanations is more plausible, we examine
next the relationship between ex-ante macroeconomic uncertainty and the change in open
interest on the announcement day. The hedging/speculating explanation predicts a decrease
in open interest while the waiting to trade explanation predicts an increase. In both cases, the
rise or drop in open interest should in magnitude be related to the degree of macroeconomic
uncertainty. Table 6 presents the aggregated results for all near-term options in Panel A and
the disaggregated results for near-term call and put options in panels B and C, respectively.
Higher macroeconomic uncertainty is consistently associated with a greater decrease in open
interest on the announcement day, which is consistent only with the hedging/speculating
explanation. The coe±cients are more signi¯cant for options written on the ten-year Treasury
note futures when we consider the open interest of all options or call options, and more
signi¯cant for options written on the ¯ve-year Treasury note and the Eurodollar futures
when we consider the open interest of put options. Note, however, that the relation between
macroeconomic uncertainty and changes in open interest is less important economically,
compared to the results for the changes in trading volume. For example, a high degree of
uncertainty about NFP equal to one standard deviation above the mean uncertainty predicts
a 0.6 percent decrease in the open interest of put options written on the ¯ve-year Treasury
note futures, compared to an unconditional increase of 1.3 percent on announcement days.
This lower level of economic importance may be because the two explanations largely o®set
each other. As hedgers and speculators unwind their positions, other traders open new ones
for reasons unrelated to the announcement, leaving open interest largely unchanged.
Finally, we examine the patterns in option trading volume for several days preceding the
announcement. The aim of this analysis is to shed further light on whether the di®erence
in trading volume from before to after the announcement is due to volume being unusually
low before the announcement, a \calm before the storm" e®ect, or unusually high after the
announcement, from the unwinding of hedge and speculative positions. The results are not
tabulated to conserve space, but we discuss here the ¯ndings for options written on the
¯ve-year Treasury note futures. We focus on the ¯ve-year maturity because it features the
strongest response of trading volume to macroeconomic uncertainty. The results for the
other maturities are qualitatively similar. Unconditionally, we ¯nd that there is a signi¯cant
drop in option trading volume one and two days before the announcement, relative to three
and four days before the announcement as well as relative to one and two days after the
announcement. Conditionally, the drop in trading volume during this two-day period before
the announcement increases with the degree of macroeconomic uncertainty. This evidence is
17consistent with a calm before the storm e®ect and with this calm being calmer the stronger
the storm is expected to be. In conjunction with our open interest evidence above, these
results also con¯rm our earlier conjecture that market participants enter into hedge or
speculative position several days prior to the announcement.
4.4.2 Aggregate stock index
Turning next to the equity market, we ¯rst conduct the same analysis for trading volume and
open interest of S&P 500 index options. Given the lack of an empirical relationship between
macroeconomic uncertainty and changes in implied volatility of index options, we do not
expect to observe a relationship between macroeconomic uncertainty and trading activity.
Nevertheless, the stock index results as serve natural benchmark for the more interesting
¯ndings involving cyclical stock options presented below.
Table 7 shows the results for option trading volume. In all cases, there is a positive
relationship between macroeconomic uncertainty and changes in trading volume of call and
put options, just as we observe for the bond market. However, none of the coe±cients is
statistically signi¯cant, and the explanatory power of the regressions is very modest. Table
8 presents the corresponding results for changes in open interest. In this table, the e®ect of
macroeconomic uncertainty is less clear, with coe±cients taking di®erent signs for di®erent
maturities and for call versus put options. Again, none of the coe±cients is statistically
signi¯cant, and the explanatory power of the regressions is very modest. We conclude that,
as expected, there is no evidence of a relationship between macroeconomic uncertainty and
trading activity in stock index options.
4.4.3 Cyclical and non-cyclical stocks
Since cyclical stocks react more strongly to macroeconomic news (see Table 1) and their
implied volatilities re°ect the uncertainty about upcoming announcements (see Table 4), it
seems logical to expect that trading activity in cyclical stock options is also more responsive
to the degree of macroeconomic uncertainty. We therefore examine next the changes in
trading volume and open interest of options written on cyclical stocks surrounding NFP
announcements. Table 9 documents the relation between our measure of macroeconomic
uncertainty and changes in trading volume of all cyclical options (in Panel A) and of cyclical
call and put options separately (in panels B and C). In all cases, greater macroeconomic
uncertainty is associated with a larger increase in option trading volume immediately
following the announcement, mirroring our results for bonds in Section 4.4.1. In aggregate as
well as for calls alone, this relation is strongest, both in economic magnitude and statistical
18signi¯cance, for medium maturity options with an average of 46 days to maturity. For puts,
in contrast, the results are strongest for shorter maturities of 15 days on average. Table 10
complements this analysis with corresponding results for changes in open interest. In all
cases, greater macroeconomic uncertainty is associated with a larger drop in open interest
following the announcement. In aggregate and for calls, this e®ect is signi¯cant only for
medium maturities. For puts, the coe±cients on macroeconomic uncertainty are signi¯cant,
at least marginally at the ten-percent level, even for short maturities.
These results are in principle again consistent with two di®erent trading motives. Market
participants could be using cyclical stock options to either hedge against or speculate on the
economic release. Both activities predict that the announcement is followed by higher volume
and a drop of open interest as hedge or speculative positions are unwound. Furthermore, in
both cases the bene¯ts from hedging or the potential gains from speculating increase with
the degree of uncertainty about the announcement, leading to indistinguishable regression
estimates. However, economic intuition makes hedging the more likely explanation of our
results for cyclical stocks. This is because it seems far more likely that cyclical stock options
are used to hedge against the e®ect of macroeconomic news on the cyclical stocks that
underly these options, than that cyclical stock options are used to speculate broadly on
announcements. After all, it is considerably cheaper to trade ¯xed income futures options
than individual equity options, and the relation between bond returns and macroeconomic
news is more than ¯ve times less noisy than that between cyclical stock returns and
macroeconomic news (see Table 1). We conclude that, while our results for cyclical stocks
are consistent with speculative trading, this explanation seems economically implausible.
For completeness, we repeat this analysis one last time for non-cyclical stocks. The
results, which are not tabulated to conserve space, con¯rm our earlier ¯ndings that non-
cyclical stocks are even less related to macroeconomic announcements than the aggregate
market index. Neither changes in option trading volume nor changes in open interest
are signi¯cantly related to the uncertainty about NFP announcements. Furthermore, the
regression coe±cients on our measure of macroeconomic uncertainty take on di®erent signs
for di®erent maturities and option types.
5 Conclusion
We established an empirical link between the ex-ante uncertainty about macroeconomic
fundamentals and the ex-post resolution of this uncertainty in ¯nancial markets. We
measured macroeconomic uncertainty using prices of economic derivatives and related
19this measure to changes in implied volatilities of stock and bond options when the
economic data is released. Across the di®erent assets we considered, we found that higher
macroeconomic uncertainty is associated with greater reduction in implied volatilities. For
bonds, the relationship between macroeconomic uncertainty and changes in implied volatility
is statistically and economically highly signi¯cant. Our uncertainty measure captures more
than 50 percent of the variation in the drop of implied volatility across announcement days.
Furthermore, a high degree of uncertainty equal to one standard deviation above the average
uncertainty in our sample predicts more than a one-third drop in the implied volatility of
medium- to long-term bond options, compared to an unconditional drop in implied volatility
of about 10 percent on announcement days. The results are considerably weaker for the
aggregate stock index. We showed, by further decomposing the aggregate stock index into
cyclical and non-cyclical stocks, that these weaker results are largely due to non-cyclical
stocks not responding to macroeconomic news. Cyclical stocks exhibit qualitatively the same
signi¯cant relation between macroeconomic uncertainty and changes in implied volatility as
bonds, though quantitatively the results for cyclical stocks are still weaker.
We also examined the relationship between our measure of macroeconomic uncertainty
and trading activity in stock and bond option markets surrounding the announcements.
Higher macroeconomic uncertainty is associated with greater volume as well as larger drops
in open interest of both bond and cyclical stock options following the announcements. These
results are consistent with market participants using the option markets to either hedge
against or speculate on the macroeconomic releases. We argued, however, that, at least in
the case of cyclical stock options, the hedging explanation is economically more plausible.
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22Table 1: Macroeconomic news and ¯nancial markets returns
This table shows the results of estimating the following regression:
Rett;t¡1 = ® + ¯Snfp;t + enfp;t;
where Rett;t¡1 represents, in Panel A ,the daily percentage return on the 30-year Treasury bond
futures (US), the 10-year Treasury note futures (TY), the 5-year Treasury note futures (FV), or
the Eurodollar futures (ED). In Panel B, Rett;t¡1 represents the daily percentage returns on the
S&P 500 index, the return on a portfolio of cyclical stocks, or the return on a portfolio of non-
cyclical stocks. Snfp;t represents the standardized di®erence between the actual NFP release and
the implied market forecast, as de¯ned in equation (19).
Panel A: Bond market
US TY FV ED
constant -0.00134 -0.00124 -0.00074 0.00010
std surprise -0.00817¤¤¤ -0.00618¤¤¤ -0.00444¤¤¤ -0.00033¤¤¤
R2 0.4666 0.5159 0.5306 0.5073
observations 32 32 32 32
Panel B: Stock market
S&P 500 Cyclical Non-cyclical
constant -0.00028 0.00076 -0.00046
std surprise 0.001249 0.00463¤ -0.00025
R2 0.0177 0.0924 0.0005
observations 32 32 32
¤ ¤ ¤, ¤¤, and ¤ denote statistical signi¯cance at the one, ¯ve, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
23Table 2: Resolution of bond market uncertainty
This table shows the results of estimating the following regression:
(IVt ¡ IVt¡1)=IVt¡1 = ® + ¯¾t + et;
where IVt is the implied volatility on the day of the release, obtained either from options with
the closest maturity (column (1)), or interpolated at the 30 days horizon (column (2)). We also
estimate the same regression substituting IVt with IVt+1 (column (3) and (4)). Panel A, B, C, and
D show the results for options on the 30-year Treasury bond futures (US), on the 10-year Treasury
note futures (TY), on the 5-year Treasury note futures (FV), and on the Eurodollar futures (ED),
respectively.
Panel A: US
(1) (2) (3) (4)
release day release day day after day after
option's time to maturity closest 30 closest 30
constant 0.15853¤¤ 0.17990¤¤¤ 0.20451¤¤¤ 0.15632¤¤
economic ¾ -0.00270¤¤¤ -0.00272¤¤¤ -0.00297¤¤¤ -0.00227¤¤¤
R2 0.3754 0.4807 0.3494 0.2975
observations 32 32 32 32
Panel B: TY
(1) (2) (3) (4)
release day release day day after day after
option's time to maturity closest 30 closest 30
constant 0.17581¤¤ 0.17093¤¤¤ 0.20946¤¤ 0.18405¤¤
economic ¾ -0.00302¤¤¤ -0.00273¤¤¤ -0.00320¤¤¤ -0.00274¤¤¤
R2 0.3315 0.4174 0.3330 0.3373
observations 32 32 32 32
24Panel C: FV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
release day release day day after day after
option's time to maturity closest 30 closest 30
constant 0.23289¤¤¤ 0.21440¤¤¤ 0.27178¤¤¤ 0.23143¤¤¤
economic ¾ -0.00374¤¤¤ -0.00326¤¤¤ -0.00393¤¤¤ -0.00328¤¤¤
R2 0.4660 0.4196 0.4399 0.3909
observations 32 32 32 32
Panel D: ED
(1) (2) (3) (4)
release day release day day after day after
option's time to maturity closest 30 closest 30
constant 0.07344 0.23242¤¤ 0.14677 0.27281¤
economic ¾ -0.00174 -0.00346¤¤¤ -0.00242¤ -0.00349¤¤
R2 0.0605 0.2022 0.0935 0.1602
observations 32 32 32 32
¤ ¤ ¤, ¤¤, and ¤ denote statistical signi¯cance at the one, ¯ve, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
25Table 3: Resolution of aggregate stock market uncertainty
This table shows the results of estimating the following regression:
(IVt ¡ IVt¡1)=IVt¡1 = ® + ¯¾t + °Rett;t¡1 + et;
where IVt is the stock market implied volatility and Rett;t¡1 is the S&P 500 index return on the day
of the release. We also estimate the same regression substituting IVt with IVt+1 and Rett;t¡1 with
Rett+1;t¡1. Panel A shows the results for the average implied volatility obtained from all options
on the S&P 500 Index interpolated at a 30-day time to maturity. Panel B shows the results for the
average implied volatility of options traded on both the pre-announcement and the announcement
day for the traded maturities.
Panel A: S&P 500 standardized options
release day day after
constant 0.00615 0.04777
S&P 500 return -2.83677¤¤¤ -3.46223¤¤¤
economic ¾ -0.00006 -0.00042
R2 0.6552 0.6940
observations 27 27
Panel B: S&P 500 raw options
release day release day day after day after
options' average time to maturity 15.26 45.85 15.26 45.85
average no. of options 47.07 33.59 45.70 33.00
constant 0.01030 -0.00895 0.14158 0.04918¤¤
S&P 500 return -1.10657¤ -0.89356¤¤ 0.21112 -0.66554¤
economic ¾ -0.00011 0.00012 -0.00030 -0.00033
R2 0.1233 0.1635 0.0051 0.1771
observations 27 27 27 27
¤ ¤ ¤, ¤¤, and ¤ denote statistical signi¯cance at the one, ¯ve, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
26Table 4: Resolution of cyclical stock uncertainty
This table shows the results of estimating the following regression:
(IVt ¡ IVt¡1)=IVt¡1 = ® + ¯¾t + °Rett;t¡1 + et;
where IVt is the implied volatility of a portfolio of cyclical stocks and Rett;t¡1 is the return of
a portfolio of cyclical stocks on the day of the release. We also estimate the same regression
substituting IVt with IVt+1 and Rett;t¡1 with Rett+1;t¡1. Panel A shows the results for the average
implied volatility obtained from all options on cyclical stocks interpolated at a 30-day time to
maturity, traded on both the pre-announcement and the announcement day. Panel B shows the
results for the average implied volatility of options traded on both the pre-announcement and the
announcement day for the two traded maturities around the 30-day horizon.
Panel A: Standardized options on cyclical stocks
release day day after
constant 0.01340 0.03539¤¤
cyclical stocks return -1.03982¤¤¤ -1.14837¤¤¤
economic ¾ -0.00017¤ -0.00017¤
R2 0.7736 0.7955
observations 27 27
Panel B: Raw options on cyclical stocks
release day release day day after day after
options' average time to maturity 15.26 45.85 15.26 45.85
average no. of options 77.07 111.26 68.44 110.22
constant 0.01929 0.01781 0.13544¤¤¤ 0.04574¤¤¤
cyclical stocks return -0.58717¤¤ -0.51209¤¤¤ -0.21530 -0.49318¤¤¤
economic ¾ -0.00032¤ -0.00020¤ -0.00055¤ -0.00023¤
R2 0.2589 0.4306 0.0686 0.3763
Observations 27 27 27 27
¤ ¤ ¤, ¤¤, and ¤ denote statistical signi¯cance at the one, ¯ve, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
27Table 5: Bond market options volume
This table shows the results of estimating the following regression:
(V olut ¡ V olut¡1)=V olut¡1 = ® + ¯¾t + et;
where V olut is the trading volume for option contracts with the closest quarterly maturity traded
on the release day t. Column (1) shows the results for options on the 30-year Treasury futures
(US), column (2) for options written on the 10-year Treasury futures (TY), column (3) for options
written on the 5-year Treasury futures (FV), and column (4) for options written on the Eurodollar
(ED).
Panel A: All options
(1) (2) (3) (4)
US TY FV ED
constant -0.67134 -0.33427 -1.32860¤¤ -0.06627
economic ¾ 0.01064¤ 0.00382 0.01523¤¤¤ 0.01087
R2 0.0864 0.0459 0.2104 0.0184
observations 32 32 32 32
Panel B: Call options
(1) (2) (3) (4)
US TY FV ED
constant -1.00391 0.34584 -0.30697 -1.4007
economic ¾ 0.01567¤ 0.00189 0.00777 0.03208¤
R2 0.1042 0.0040 0.0151 0.0628
observations 32 32 32 32
Panel C: Put options
(1) (2) (3) (4)
US TY FV ED
constant -0.57489 -0.63916¤ -1.15664¤¤ 0.16554
economic ¾ 0.01089 0.006766¤ 0.01270¤¤ 0.00436
R2 0.0512 0.1121 0.1694 0.0062
observations 32 32 32 32
¤ ¤ ¤, ¤¤, and ¤ denote statistical signi¯cance at the one, ¯ve, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
28Table 6: Bond market options open interest
This table shows the results of estimating the following regression:
(Ointt ¡ Ointt¡1)=Ointt¡1 = ® + ¯¾t + et;
where Ointt is the open interest for option contracts with the closest quarterly maturity traded
on the release day t. Column (1) shows the results for options on the 30-year Treasury futures
(US), column (2) for options written on the 10-year Treasury futures (TY), column (3) for options
written on the 5-year Treasury futures (FV), and column (4) for options written on the Eurodollar
(ED).
Panel A: All options
(1) (2) (3) (4)
US TY FV ED
constant 0.01913 0.03532¤¤¤ 0.05235¤¤ 0.00793
economic ¾ -0.00006 -0.00029¤¤ -0.00039¤ -0.00009¤
R2 0.0144 0.1561 0.0695 0.0834
observations 32 32 32 32
Panel B: Call options
(1) (2) (3) (4)
US TY FV ED
constant 0.03241 0.03686¤ 0.04222 0.00237
economic ¾ -0.00014 -0.00036¤ -0.00018 -0.00007
R2 0.0031 0.0949 0.0055 0.0146
observations 32 32 32 32
Panel C: Put options
(1) (2) (3) (4)
US TY FV ED
constant 0.01394 0.03670 0.05265¤ 0.01896¤
economic ¾ -0.00005 -0.00024 -0.00042¤ -0.00017¤
R2 0.0021 0.0290 0.0699 0.096
observations 32 32 32 32
¤ ¤ ¤, ¤¤, and ¤ denote statistical signi¯cance at the one, ¯ve, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
29Table 7: S&P 500 index options volume
This table shows the results of estimating the following regression:
(V olut ¡ V olut¡1)=V olut¡1 = ® + ¯¾t + et;
where V olut is the trading volume for option contracts written on the S&P 500 index on the release
day t. Column (1) shows the results for options written on the shortest traded maturity and column
(2) for the next traded maturity.
Panel A: All options
(1) (2)
short maturity medium maturity
average time to maturity (days) 15.26 45.85
average no. of traded options 47.07 33.59
constant -0.33601 0.84945
economic ¾ 0.00478 0.00471
R2 0.0653 0.0212
observations 27 27
Panel B: Call options
(1) (2)
short maturity medium maturity
average time to maturity (days) 15.26 45.85
average no. of traded options 20.63 14.37
constant -0.46587 0.79421
economic ¾ 0.00608 -0.00235
R2 0.0654 0.0017
observations 27 27
Panel C: Put options
(1) (2)
short maturity medium maturity
average time to maturity (days) 15.26 45.85
average no. of traded options 26.44 19.22
constant -0.00401 1.30675¤
economic ¾ 0.00184 0.00722
R2 0.0074 0.0602
observations 27 27
¤ ¤ ¤, ¤¤, and ¤ denote statistical signi¯cance at the one, ¯ve, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
30Table 8: S&P 500 index options open interest
This table shows the results of estimating the following regression:
(Ointt ¡ Ointt¡1)=Ointt¡1 = ® + ¯¾t + et;
where Ointt is the open interest for option contracts written on the S&P 500 index on the release
day t. Column (1) shows the results for options written on the shortest traded maturity and column
(2) for the next traded maturity.
Panel A: All options
(1) (2)
short maturity medium maturity
average time to maturity (days) 15.26 45.85
average no. of traded options 47.07 33.59
constant 0.02279** 0.02849
economic ¾ -0.54726 0.00016
R2 0.0118 0.0103
observations 27 27
Panel B: Call options
(1) (2)
short maturity medium maturity
average time to maturity (days) 15.26 45.85
average no. of traded options 20.63 14.37
constant 0.00993 0.00720
economic ¾ 0.00004 -0.00039
R2 0.0016 0.0588
observations 27 27
Panel C: Put options
(1) (2)
short maturity medium maturity
average time to maturity (days) 15.26 45.85
average no. of traded options 26.44 19.22
constant 0.03521** 0.02268
economic ¾ -0.00019 0.00025
R2 0.0510 0.0202
observations 27 27
¤ ¤ ¤, ¤¤, and ¤ denote statistical signi¯cance at the one, ¯ve, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
31Table 9: Cyclical stocks options volume
This table shows the results of estimating the following regression:
(V olut ¡ V olut¡1)=V olut¡1 = ® + ¯¾t + et;
where V olut is the trading volume for option contracts written on cyclical stocks on the release day
t. Column (1) shows the results for options written on the shortest traded maturity and column
(2) for the next traded maturity.
Panel A: All options
(1) (2)
short maturity medium maturity
average time to maturity (days) 15.26 45.85
average no. of traded options 77.07 111.26
constant -0.48866 -0.58327
economic ¾ 0.00706¤ 0.00816¤
R2 0.0884 0.1037
observations 27 27
Panel B: Call options
(1) (2)
short maturity medium maturity
average time to maturity (days) 15.26 45.85
average no. of traded options 39.37 60.00
constant -0.31805 -0.69155
economic ¾ 0.00523 0.01002¤
R2 0.0323 0.1147
observations 27 27
Panel C: Put options
(1) (2)
short maturity medium maturity
average time to maturity (days) 15.26 45.85
average no. of traded options 37.70 51.26
constant -0.77799 -0.57321
economic ¾ 0.01119¤¤ 0.00745¤
R2 0.1546 0.0949
observations 27 27
¤ ¤ ¤, ¤¤, and ¤ denote statistical signi¯cance at the one, ¯ve, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
32Table 10: Cyclical stocks options open interest
This table shows the results of estimating the following regression:
(Ointt ¡ Ointt¡1)=Ointt¡1 = ® + ¯¾t + et;
where Ointt is the open interest for option contracts written on cyclical stocks on the release day
t. Column (1) shows the results for options written on the shortest traded maturity and column
(2) for the next traded maturity.
Panel A: All options
(1) (2)
short maturity medium maturity
average time to maturity (days) 15.26 45.85
average no. of traded options 77.07 111.26
constant 0.03570¤¤ 0.12979¤¤¤
economic ¾ -0.00012 -0.00085¤¤
R2 0.0271 0.1745
observations 27 27
Panel B: Call options
(1) (2)
short maturity medium maturity
average time to maturity (days) 15.26 45.85
average no. of traded options 39.37 60.00
constant 0.00933 0.12800¤¤¤
economic ¾ -0.00015 -0.00083¤¤
R2 0.0210 0.1823
observations 27 27
Panel C: Put options
(1) (2)
short maturity medium maturity
average time to maturity (days) 15.26 45.85
average no. of traded options 37.70 51.26
constant 0.08012¤¤¤ 0.12488¤¤¤
economic ¾ -0.00052¤ -0.00077¤
R2 0.1121 0.1242
observations 27 27
¤ ¤ ¤, ¤¤, and ¤ denote statistical signi¯cance at the one, ¯ve, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
33Figure 1: Data
This ¯gure shows an example of the data source used to obtain economic derivatives prices.
Goldman Sachs compiles a report at the end of each auction on U.S. Non-Farm Payrolls containing
the ¯nal prices of vanilla and digital call and put options, for each level of strike prices. The clearing
prices are the ¯nal outcome of the auction. In contrast, the ask and bid prices are automatically
generated by adding and subtracting a ¯xed fee from the clearing prices.
34Figure 2: Macroeconomic uncertainty and ¯nancial markets volatility
This plot shows a time-series of the macroeconomic uncertainty implicit in the price of economic
derivatives (dotted line), the VIX (light continuous line), and the implied volatility of options
written on the 30-year Treasury bond futures (dark continuous line).
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